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CORPORATE PLAINTIFFS IN LIBEL ACTIONS:
ROSENBLOOM RESURRECTED?
Corporations, like natural persons, have always desired redress
from unwarranted assaults on their good names. Maintenance of a
good reputation is a necessary component of a corporation's poten
tial for profit, since customers' decisions are often influenced by
their perceptions of the corporation's image. The vast amounts of
money expended on corporate advertising indicate the importance
which corporations attach to maintaining an exemplary public pro
file. The approach taken by one federal district court decision
involving a corporate libel action, however, handicaps many small
corporations in defending their reputations against unwarranted as
saults. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper! resur
rected the Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 2 issue-based test for
determining the applicability of the actual malice standard to a cor
porate plaintiff.
The Rosenbloom test, totally rejected by the United States Su
preme Court as it applies to natural persons, demands that a plain
tiff in a libel action prove that the defendant published the alleged
libelous statement with actual malice whenever matters of general
or public interest are involved. Because the Rosenbloom test ig
nores the status of the defamed plaintiff as either public or private
figure, the Martin Marietta decision imposes the almost insur
mountable actual malice standard on corporate plaintiffs based
solely on their corporate status and the presence of a public contro
versy. Important factors such as the corporation's size, purpose, or
activities do not enter into the decision. This judicial approach to
the defamation of corporations, if extensively followed, could dam
age the continued vitality of many such entities.
The common law presumed damages in actions for libel from
the fact of publication. 3 Courts applied this rule to individuals and
1. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D. D.C. 1976).
2. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The status oriented public figure standard established by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), supposedly superseded the issue
based standard of Rosenbloom. The court in Martin Marietta, however, distin
guished Gertz as applying only to private persons. It found the Rosenbloom test best
suited to simultaneously protect both first amendment considerations and corporate
reputations. See 417 F. Supp. at 956. See also Comment, In Search of the Corporate
Private Figure: Defamation of the Corporation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 339, 358-60
(1978).
3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964).
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corporations alike. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 however,
the United States Supreme Court held that under the first amend
ment, public officials cannot recover damages in a libel action un
less the defendant's publication was found to have been made with
actual malice. 5 Actual malice was defined as publication "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."6 The Court required that actual malice be proved
with "convincing clarity."7
Since New York Times, the Court has had occasion to expand
and further clarify the situations in which a plaintiff must prove ac
tual malice before recovery will be permitted. One of the most sig
nificant extensions was the inclusion of "public figures"8 within the
structures of the standard. 9 This comment seeks to determine if
the opinion in Martin Marietta, to the extent it relies on the
Rosenbloom test, comports with the Supreme Court decisions after
New York Times. The difficulties encountered by the Court in fash
ioning and applying a proper constitutional test for libel actions will
be analyzed as they particularly relate to corporations. Two other
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Id. at 279-80.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 285-86. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Supreme
Court refined its definition of actual malice by explaining: "[R]eckless conduct is not
measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would
have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to pennit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication." Id. at 731-32.
8. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court in Butts de
fined public figures as those persons who are "intimately involved in the resolution
of important public questions or [who], by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large." Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
9. New York Times Co. announced that a person who held a position in the
governmental structure (a public official) was required to prove publication with ac
tual malice as a prerequisite to recovery in a libel action against a mass media de
fendant. 376 U.S. 254. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the ac
tual malice standard was extended to those persons classified as public figures. In
Rosenbloom, a plurality of the Court detennined that the protection of the New York
Times rule should apply to any statement concerning "a matter ... of public or gen
eral interest," whether involVing a private or public individual. 403 U.S. at 43. Three
years later, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court
returned to a test based on the status of the plaintiff as public official or public fig
ure. Finally, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court's most recent
decision concerning the actual malice standard, an effort was made to more clearly
define the standards a plaintiff must meet in order to qualify as a public figure. The
Court held that to be considered a public figure requires the person to be prominent
in the affairs of society or exert influence over public controversies. Id. at 453. The
Court's success in its attempted clarification is the subject of present debate.
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federal district court cases lO dealing with the application of the ac
tual malice standard to a corporate plaintiff will be compared with
the Martin Marietta opinion. Finally, the comment proposes crite
ria to be used in a court's determination of the proper classification
of the corporate plaintiff.
In Martin Marietta, an article in the Washington Star reported
that the Martin Marietta Corporation, a defense contractor, had
given a "stag" party for a soon to be married "top Air Force offi
cial" at which one-third of the forty to fifty guests were Depart
ment of Defense personnel. l l The article stated that one of two
prostitutes attending the party was paid $3,000 "by a Martin
Marietta representative. "12 The article claimed that one of the
prostitutes "reportedly swung naked from the antlers of an animal
head mounted on one of the lodge's walls."13 Martin Marietta insti
tuted a libel action against the newspaper seeking $5,000,000 in
compensatory damages, $lO,OOO,OOO in punitive damages, and an
injunction requiring the Star to print a retraction admitting the fal
sity of the story.14 In finding for the defendant, the district court
held that the contents of the article involved matters of "public or
general interest"15 or, alternatively, that Martin Marietta was a
"public figure"16 for the purposes of the issue involved because it
had thrust itself into a matter of public controversy.17 On either
10. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
11. 417 F. Supp. at 950.

12. [d.
13.

[d.

14. [d. at 949. These figures were not based on any lost revenues, but were in
stead based purely on what counsel considered to be just compensation for the harm
done.
15. [d. at 954. The use of the public or general interest standard was based on
Rosenbloom. The Supreme Court held there that publications which concerned mat
ters of general interest were constitutionally protected unless the plaintiff could
prove publication with actual malice. 403 U.S. 29.
The district court relied on the public or general 'interest standard despite the
Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
repudiating Rosenbloom without qualification. The court justified its application of
the Rosenbloom test on the grounds that the Gertz decision was directed solely at in
dividuals and that, "[Tlhe values considered important enough to merit accommoda
tion with interests protected by the first amendment are associated solely with natu
ral persons, and that corporations, while legal persons for some purposes, possess
none of the attributes the Court sought to protect." 417 F. Supp. at 955.
16. [d. at 956. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
17. 417 F. Supp. at 957. Martin Marietta had voluntarily decided to compete for
defense contracts and to entertain persons associated with the military to enhance its
chances of obtaining defense contracts. By so doing, Martin Marietta had voluntarily

744

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:741

basis, Martin Marietta was required to prove actual malice as a
prerequisite to recovery. The plaintiff, as a matter of law, was
unable to meet this burden. 18
The Martin Marietta decision is not significant because of the
result reached by the court. The actual malice standard clearly ap
plies under the public figure approach mandated for natural per
sons. The decision's importance arises from its reliance, albeit by
way of an alternative holding, on the issue-based Rosenbloom test.
The Martin Marietta court's assumption that the issue-based test
adequately protects all corporation bears close examination. Be
cause libel cases require courts to balance the plaintiff's right to
protect its reputation against the competing right of a defendant to
speak freely, the law of libel necessarily embraces the first amend
ment.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times,19 li
belous publications were considered to be a "class of speech wholly
unprotected by the First Amendment. . . . "20 In New Yark Times,
however, the Court recognized the competing interests at issue in
libel actions. The Court held that insofar as public officials are con
cerned, the balance must be struck in favor of free speech and
press. 21 The United States Supreme Court applied the same ra
tionale in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 22 holding that public fig
ures must prove publication with actual malice. In Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. ,23 the plurality decision of the Court went still
further, by holding that the actual malice standard applied to defa
mations of those involved in matters of public or general interest. 24
More recently, however, one federal district court has ruled
"that the Rosenbloom plurality failed, for constitutional purposes at
least, to allow the states sufficient latitude to protect private indi
viduals from libel."25 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 26 the United
thrust itself into the ongoing controversy regarding improper procurement of defense
work. The act of thrusting oneself into a matter of public controversy was one of the
bases for classification as a public figure enunciated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also note 35 infra.
18. 417 F. Supp. at 949.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974).
21. 376 U.S. at 268. See also note 8 supra.
22. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See also notes 8-9 supra.
23. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
24. ld. at 44. See also note 8 supra.
25. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 167, 172 (D.D.C.
1977).
26. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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States Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not require
application of the actual malice standard when a private individual
commences a libel suit. It held that the states' legitimate interest
in protecting the reputations of private individuals is strong enough
to justify permitting such pe~sons to recover damages from publish
ers or broadcasters under any standard short. of liability without
fault. 27 The Court in Time Inc. v. Firestone,28 neither specifically
. expanded nor contracted the scope of the standard, but instead at
tempted a further refinement of the ambit of the public figure clas
sification. In determining the status of the plaintiff, the Court
looked to whether the defamed party voluntarily thrust itself into a
controversy which itself constitutes an area of legitimate public in
terest. 29
In Gertz, the Supreme Court sought to achieve a more
"proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the
freedom of speech and press"30 when a private individual was the
object of a libelous statement. The Gertz Court felt that the plural
ity test proposed in Rosenbloom,31 which made no differentiation
between public and private individuals, did not adequately con
sider the state's legitimate interest in protecting private individuals

27. Id. at 347.
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
29. Id. at 453. Although the Gertz-Firestone formula potentially takes the sub
ject matter of the libellous statement into account, its primary focus remains on the
private versus public character of the plaintiff. This totally opposes the Rosenbloom
test as advocated by the court in Martin Marietta. Rosenbloom fails to differentiate
between the public and private plaintiff, but imposes a malice standard solely on the
basis of the newsworthiness of the statement.
30. 418 U.S. at 325. The case has been extensively noted. See Comment,
Defamation-Corporotion Held a "Person" Subject to the Gertz Test for Deter
mining Liability in a Defamation Case, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1287, 1291 n.42
(1977), listing discussions of the opinion including: Brosnahan, From Times v.
Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amend
ment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1349 (1975); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In
Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1976); Comment, Reply
and Retraction in Actions Against the Press for Defamation: The Effect of Tornillo
and Gertz, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 223 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARV. L. REV. 41, 139 (1974). Gertz also constituted the first attempt by the Su
preme Court to establish guidelines for lower courts as to the determination of
a public figure. For a discussion of these guidelines, see Comment, Defama
tion-Corporation Held a "Person" Subject to the Gertz Test for Determining Liabil
ity in a Defamation Case, supra at 1292-93.
31. 403 U.S. at 43. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
28.
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from the harm inflicted upon them by libelous publications. 32 To
accommodate these goals, the Rosenbloom test of the public or
general interest was abandoned. 33 In its place, the Gertz Court
substituted a standard which made the status of the plaintiff, as ei
ther public official or public figure,34 the determinative factor. 35
Under the new test, the subject matter or issue of the publication
was not decisive.
Several factors prompted the Court to abandon the Rosen
bloom test. First, the Court recognized that "[p]ublic officials and
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the chan
nels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals
normally enjoy. "36 As a result of their lack of "effective opportuni
ties for rebuttal,"37 private individuals are more vulnerable to in

32. 418 U.S. at 341. The Court quoted Justice Stewart, concurring in Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), to emphasize that the individual's interest in the protec
tion of his good name "reflects no more than ou.r basic concept of the essential dig
nity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty." [d. at 92. See also text accompanying note 27 supra.
33. 418 U.S. at 346.
34. The Court defined those subject to public figure status as "[tlhose who, by
reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which
they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures . . . ." [d. at
342.
35. [d. at 343. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Powell stated that the sta
tus as public figure or public official was dependent upon the following:
That deSignation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he
becomes a public figure for all purposes in all contexts. More commonly, an
individual voluntarily injects himself ... for a limited range of issues. In ei
ther case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of pub
lic questions.
[d. at 351.
36. [d. at 344 (footnote omitted). The remedy of self-help was recognized as a
function of access to available opportunities to refute the libelous statement and
thereby undo or minimize any harm done to reputation. The Court, however, stated
in a footnote:
Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of de
famatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experi
ence that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. But the fact that the self-help
remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean
that it is irrelevant to our inquiry.
ld. at 344 n.9. This language indicates the Court's astute pragmatism in recognizing
the difficulty in erasing the harm caused by a libelous statement. The effect is simi
lar to that upon a jury when it hears or sees evidence; no matter how strong the ad
monition to disregard, the fact remains that the evidence has been seen and is sel
dom forgotten.
37. [d. at 344.

CORPORATE LIBEL ACTIONS

1979]

747

jury and, therefore, require greater protection. "[T]he state inter
est in protecting them is correspondingly greater. "38
Second, the Court determined that public officials and public
figures "must accept certain necessary consequences"39 of their in
volvement in public affairs or matters placing them in the public
spotlight. In both instances, "they invite attention and com
ment. "40 The Court considered that public officials and public fig
ures had voluntarily exposed themselves to the increased risks of
defamatory falsehoods concerning them. It found no similar justifi
cation for such an assumption with respect to private individuals
since they had "not accepted public office or assumed an 'influen
tial role in ordering society.' "41 Therefore, the Court reasoned
that not only are private individuals more vulnerable to injury, but
also they are more deserving of recovery. 42
Third, the Court feared that the Rosenbloom test would force
"state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publi
cations address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do
not-to determine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, 'what in
formation is relevant to self-government.' "43 The Court "doubt[ed]
the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges."44
Finally, the Supreme Court determined that the Rosenbloom
test inadequately served "both of the competing values at stake"45
in a libel action. It considered, on the one hand, that a private in
dividual would face the difficult task of proving actual malice if
38. [d.
39. [d.
40. [d. at 345.
41. [d. (citation omitted). Although the quotation refers to "private individual,"
the specific rationales deemed important have application to corporations as well.
Nothing in the quoted language limits its relevance to the corporate plaintiff except
for the Court's phraseology, namely, "private individual." Yet it seems clear that this
title is capable of broad meaning.
The broad scope of Gertz was emphasized by the Court when it stated:
Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each par
ticular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general applica
tion. Such rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving differences as
well as similarities. Thus it is often true that not all of the considerations
which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each particular case de
cided under its authority.
418 U.S. at 343-44.
42. The Court stated, "He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protec
tion of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood." [d. at 345.
43. 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Marshall, J., dissenting in Rosenbloom).

44.
45.

[d.
[d. See also note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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matters of public or general interest were concerned. This result
would ignore the greater state interest in protecting private indi
viduals than public persons. On the other hand, the Court rea
soned that the careful broadcaster or publisher who happened to
make an error in a situation where matters of public or general in
terest were not involved could be held liable in damages. Such a
result could unduly inhibit vigorous, aggressive journalism. As a
consequence of these factors, the Court in Gertz held that so long
as liability is not imposed without fault, states could determine
their own standard of liability for libelous publications injurious to
private individuals. 46
The Rosenbloom test has been replaced by a more equitable
standard that emphasizes the public figure-private individual dis
tinction. The premises which served as a foundation for the Court's
holding in Gertz have similar utility when applied to corpora
tions. 47 Continued reliance on the principles of Rosenbloom in libel
46. Id. at 347.
47. Despite the Court's failure to address the issue of corporate applicability,
lower courts, both state and federal, had applied the actual malice standard to corpo
rations in a Significant number of pre-Gertz cases. Where a corporation was found to
be involved in activities closely related to a governmental function, it was held to be
a public official. Doctors Convalescent Center v. East Shore Newspapers, 104 Ill.
App. 2d 271, 244 N.E.2d 373 (1968) (nursing home which was licensed by state de
partment of health and some of whose patients were mentally retarded children
placed in the home as wards of the state held to be public official).
Anomer group of cases held that the actual malice standard applied because the
involved corporation was a public figure. See, e.g., Gospel Spreading Church v.
Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (church criticized for its real
estate investments, held to be a public figure); Bavarian Motor Works, Ltd. v.
Manchester, 61 Misc. 2d 309, 305 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (court held that the
status as a public figure or not was the determinative factor); see also Stevens, Pri
vate Enterprise and Public Reputation: Defamation and the Corporate Plaintiff, 12
AM. Bus. L.J. 281, 285 (1975).
More often, however, the courts required a showing of actual malice because the
corporation was found to be involved in matters of public or general interest. See,
e.g., Robinson v. American Broadcasting Cos., 441 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1971); Bel Air
Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); United Medical Laboratories,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 921 (1969); Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont.
1973); Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d
324 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Many of the cases which applied the public or general interest
rule to corporations, e.g., Beatty v. Ellings, 285 Minn. 293, 173 N.W.2d 12 (1968),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); Kruteck v. Schimmel, 27 App. Div. 2d 837, 278
N.Y.S.2d 25 (1967), predated Rosenbloom where that rule was first announced. This
apparently resulted from the lower court's erroneous interpretation of language in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), which seemed to indicate that
matters of public interest had to be involved before a person could be found to be a
public figure. The Court in Butts defined public figures as those who are "intimately
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actions commenced by a corporate plaintiff would leave many small
corporations weaponless against libel merely because the subject
matter of the libel was in the public or general interest.
Martin Marietta marked the first post-Gertz judicial encounter
with the issue of the proper standard to apply to corporate plain
tiffs in libel actions. 48 According to the court, the actual malice
standard applied because the alleged libelous article published by
the Washington Star concerned matters of public or general inter
est.49 This approach rendered the public figure standard as refined
in Gertz inapplicable to corporations. 50
The values which the district court considered important to
the Gertz decision, namely "the essential dignity and worth of ev
ery human being" and "the protection of private personality,"51
were held to be solely attributable to natural persons. 52 The Marinvolved in the resolution of important public questions or [who], by reason of their
fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id. at 164. See also note 8
supra. The reliance of lower courts on the public or general interest rule is signifi
cant because it indicates that the scope of the application of the actual malice
standard was not at all clear after Butts. Furthermore, the large number of decisions
applying the public or general interest rule may have added credence and support to
the Court's adoption of that rule in Rosenbloom. For a good discussion of the
standards applied by the courts and a wealth of citations for the period 1967 to 1974,
see Stevens, Private Enterprise and Public Reputation: Defamation and the Corpo
rate Plaintiff, supra at 283-86.
The courts had little difficulty applying the actual malice standard to corpora
tions in the pre-Gertz era. Although the bases upon which the decisions were based
often differed, the results most often were the same; the corporation involved was re
quired to prove publication with actual malice as a prerequisite to recovery.
48. As Judge Schwargen noted in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated
Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977), "The instant motion requires the Court to
determine the First Amendment standard applicable where the plaintiff is a corpora
tion rather than a natural person. Only one reported decision appears to have consid
ered the issue. Martin Marietta . ..." Id. at 819. The difficulty of the issue was also
recognized by the court in Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D. N.Y.
1977), when it stated, "In attempting to apply this 'public figure' analysis to corpora
tions as opposed to natural persons, courts have differed in their method of analysis."
Id. at 1347.
49. 417 F. Supp. at 955. See also note 15 supra and accompanying text.
50. Id. The decision requiring proof of publication with actual malice was also
based on the alternative ground that Martin Marietta was a public figure. See text ac
companying note 16 supra and notes 82-83 infra. The court stated, "[ilf, however,
higher courts, which have yet to consider the problem, should find it necessary to fit
corporate plaintiffs into this ill-fitting mold, this court concludes that Martin Marietta
is a public figure for the purposes of the instant action and, consequently, must
prove actual malice." Id. at 956. Thus, the standard applied to Martin Marietta did
not vary the result. Id.
51. 418 U.S. at 341.
52. As the court stated:
It is quite clear from the Court's [Gertz] opinion, however, that the values
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tin Marietta court relied on the premise that a corporation, regard
less of its size, nature, or activities, possessed no personal life. 53
According to Judge Flannery, the traditional distinction "between
corporate and human plaintiffs . . . limit[s] corporate recovery to
actual damages in the form of lost profits."54 Unlike an action for liconsidered important enough to merit accommodation with interests pro
tected by the first amendment are associated solely with natural persons,
and that corporations, while legal persons for some purposes, possess none
of the attributes the Court sought to protect.
417 F. Supp. at 955.
53. As a final justification for rejecting the Gertz standard in the case of the cor
porate libel plaintiff, the court cited the recently decided case of Time, Inc. v. Fire
stone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 417 F. Supp. at 955-56. Firestone constituted a refine
ment of the public figure classification by requiring that a party voluntarily thrust
himself into a controversy and that the controversy itself be of legitimate public in
terest. See note 28-29 supra and accompanying text. The Martin Marietta court con
cluded that, since "no event in the life of a corporation involves such sacred and per
sonal events as marriage and divorce," the highly personal controversies the court
sought to protect in Gertz could never be associated with corporate activity. 417 F.
Supp. at 955-56.
54. 417 F. Supp. at 955. On the other hand, natural persons have always been
allowed recovery of special and punitive damages for harm to their personal reputa
tions and damage to their psyches.
At common law, a corporation traditionally had a right to protect its good name
from libelous attack. See, e.g., Trenton Mut. Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23
N.J.L. 402 (Sup. Ct. 1852); Shoe and Leather Bank v. Thompson, 18 Abb. Pro 413
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865). Although a corporation had no personal reputation and could
not be subject to mental anguish, as a natural person could (see, e.g., Diplomat Elec.
Inc. V. Westinghouse Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967); Golden Palace, Inc.
V. NBC, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 107 (D. D.C. 1974); Eason Publication v. Atlanta Gazette,
141 Ga. App. 321, 233 S.E.2d 232 (1977», it did have prestige and standing in the
business community which could be injured by a defamatory attack. E.g., Pullman
Standard Car Mfg. CO. V. Local 2928, United Steel Workers, 152 F.2d 493 (7th Cir.
1945), Digiorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350
(1963). It has been said, "language which casts an aspersion upon [a corporation's]
honesty, credit, efficiency or other business character may be actionable." W.
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 111, at 745 (4th ed. 1971); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) TORTS, § 561(1) (1977). Further, corporations were permitted to allege that
defamations aimed at them were libelous per se. This meant an action was maintain
able without proof of special damages if the charge was defamatory and if it injuri
ously and directly affected the credibility of the corporation thereby causing pecuni
ary loss. E.g., Brayton V. Crowell Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1953). See
also Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local 2928, United Steel Workers, 152 F.2d
493 (7th Cir. 1945), where the court stated, "[in] determining what constitutes libel
per se, the courts have often asked: Will the defamatory matter injure the credit,
property, or business of the corporation?" Id. at 496. The court added that a matter
attacking a person's reputation for honesty and veracity is also libelous per se and
the same standard should be applied to the corporate plaintiff. Id. But see Note, Cor
porate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal
Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 983 (1975). Courts have agreed that the only
manifestation of the injury suffered by a corporation is a loss of business and the
commensurate decrease in income. E.g., Digiorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal.
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bel brought by a private individual, it concluded that a corporate
libel action was devoid of matters "'basic [to] our constitutional
system,' and need not force the first amendment to yield as far as
it would be [sic] in a private libel action. "55
Judge Flannery reasoned,however, that it would be unjust to
apply the malice standard to any libel action brought by a corpo
rate plaintiff. 56 Instead, he believed that the Rosenbloom standard
of requiring proof of actual malice "where issues of legitimate pub
lic concern are discussed, "57 afforded corporations sufficient protec
tion from libelous attacks. Thus, he held that the issue-based
standard of Rosenbloom properly balanced the interests of first
amendment rights and the protection of the corporate reputation in
libel actions instituted by a corporation. 58
Although the Martin Marietta opinion is well reasoned in
some respects, it fails in several crucial aspects to confront the full
impact of Gertz and the practicalities of corporate existence. Gertz
recognized the protection of the reputation of private individuals as
a legitimate interest of the state. 59 Similarly, a state desires to pro
tect the reputations of "corporate individuals" whom it has fos
tered, because corporations occupy an important position in the
structure of modern society.
Although a corporation cannot suffer mental anguish,60 it can
suffer harm to its business reputation in the community as a conse
quence of a libel. The ability of a corporation to function within a
community rests largely on its ability to develop goodwill within
that community. Furthermore, the economic damage suffered by a
corporation grows in significance in light of the fact that corpora
tions have only an economic component. Economic damage to a
corporation threatens its continued existence.
App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1963). C/. Stov v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 407 F.2d
1318 (3d Cir. 1969) (bank wrongfully dishonored one of plaintiff's checks which re
sulted in harm to plaintiff's reputation and subsequent loss of business, court
awarded damages equaling two years' lost profits).
55. 417 F. Supp. at 955. Justice Stewart, concurring in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 95 (1966), had observed that one of the basic goals of our constitutional sys
tem is to protect individuals' reputations. See also note 32 and text accompanying
note 29 supra.
56~ 417 F. Supp. at 956.
57. Id. See also text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
58. The court stated, "[t1his approach grants some deference to the values un
derlying corporate libel actions grounded in state law, while at the same time re
sulting in only a minor encroachment on the first amendment, which was designed
primarily to defend the market place of ideas." Id.
59. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
60. See note 54 supra.
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Corporate libel actions are justified by the need for a corpo
rate recovery. Although a libelous statement aimed at a corporation
often reflects directly on the corporate officers who may also have
individual causes of action against the libellant, individual recovery
does not compensate the corporation. A libelous attack on the cor
poration would result in economic losses to that corporation. These
losses would probably be sustained by the stockholders who would
remain uncompensated through actions brough by individuals. Be
cause the stockholders have no individual cause of action, their
only recovery is through a corporate libel suit. The nexus between
individual reputations and corporate defamation militates toward
similar treatment for corporations and natural persons. This nexus
is especially strong when the defamatory statement is directed
against the mom and pop-type corporation. In this situation, the
public is likely to equate the corporate reputation of Mom & Pop,
Inc. with that of mom and pop. Consequently, a judgment against
the corporation is,_ in effect, a judgment against those who direct
the company. In this respect, the consequences of libel against a
corporation can approximate those suffered by an individual more
than the Martin Marietta court recognized.
Another similarity between corporations and individuals con
cerns the ability to adequately reply to the alleged libel. Many
small corporations lack the financial ability to purchase space in the
local newspaper or time on the community radio station to refute
the alleged defamatory remarks directed at them. Others are with
out sufficient "news glamour" necessary to convince the local editor
or station manager that they deserve equal time or space to retort.
All in all, this type of corporation is subject to practical limitations
equivalent to those facing individuals.
Of course, Martin Marietta Corporation is not a Mom and Pop
enterprise. No attempt is made here to equate the two. Neither is
the point advanced that Martin Marietta should be allowed to
freely wield a corporate libel suit under a rule designed to protect
Mom and Pop. However, the vast differences between the two en
terprises cannot be given proper effect by the issue-based Rosen
bloom test. The shortcomings of the Rosenbloom test were recog
nized by the court in Trans Warld Accounts v. Associated Press, 61
which openly criticized the Rosenbloom test as adopted by Martin
Marietta and applied the status-based test of Gertz and Firestone.
61.

425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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In Trans World Accounts, the alleged libel arose out of an er
roneous report published by the Associated Press (AP). The article
mistakenly indicated that Trans World was being charged with four
types of unfair and deceptive trade practices by the Federal Trade
Commission (FfC).62 In fact, only two types of illegal activity were
asserted by the FfC.63 In granting the defendant's motion for sum
mary judgment, the court held that Trans World was a public fig
ure as a result of having been "drawn into a particular public con
troversy. "64
In basing its holding on the Gertz public figure rationale, the
Trans World court explicitly disagreed 65 with the reasoning em
ployed in Martin Marietta. In its view, the public or general inter
est test had been rejected by the Supreme Court without qualifica
tion. 66 More important, however, it found a basic flaw in the
corporate-individual dichotomy relied upon in Martin Marietta.
The court reasoned that although the libel cases decided by the
Supreme Court had been premised on the idea of protecting the
rights of individuals, "it is also true that the line between the inter
ests of natural persons and corporations is frequently fuzzy and ill
defined. "67 The various legal considerations which lead to decisions
to incorporate often result in organizations being called corpora
tions while they actually behave as either a partnership or sole pro
prietorship. For this reason, the court found that for the purposes
of applying the first amendment to libel actions "the distinction be
tween corporation and individuals is one without a difference. "68
62. ld. at 817. Specifically, the article indicated that the FTC was charging
Trans World with (1) the use of collection forms in the form of urgent telegraphic
messages, (2) the use of forms falsely stating that legal action was about to be insti
tuted, (3) the use of letters threatening debtors with damage to their credit ratings
unless bills were promptly paid, and (4) falsely holding themselves out as bona fide
collection agencies when, in fact, the companies were only mailing services engaged
in sending out form letters to debtors.
63. ld. The FTC noted that charges three and four were not being directed at
Trans World.
64. The court stated:
[Trans World) cannot be said to have become a public figure by having
achieved "pervasive fame or notoriety." Nor can it be said that it "voluntar
ily inject[edl [itlself ... into a particular public controversy." But Gertz rec
ognizes that a person may become a public figure for a limited range of is
sues by having been "drawn into a particular public controversy."
ld. at 819-20. See also note 35 supra.
65. 425 F. Supp. at 819.
66. ld.

67. ld.
68.

ld.
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The Rosenbloom test might suffice if all corporate entities
were as large as General Motors or IBM. The Trans World court
noted, however, that there are thousands of businesses incorpora
ted in the United States, all varying in size and notoriety. To re
vert to a test that failed to appreciate such differences would allow
libel cases to turn on the ad hoc determinations regarding which
items were matters of general or public interest. 69 Gertz con
demned this methodology.
The bankruptcy of the Rosenbloom test was also recognized by
the court in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's.70 In that case, an
article appearing in Barron's71 analyzed the plaintiff's proposed
public stock offering and the accounting incident to it. Barron's re
ported that the purpose of the public offering was to serve the
plaintiff's parent organization. 72 The article implied that the parent
"was employing certain 'creative accounting' concepts and engaging
in improprieties, bad business judgment and breach of fiduciary
duties, all of which led to its decision to market" the stock issue. 73
While the court found the article to be libelous, it granted Barron's
motion for summary judgment, holding that as a result of the pub
lic stock offering, Reliance had voluntarily thrust itself into the
public arena thereby becoming a public figure. 74 Since the plaintiff
could not prove publication with actual malice, it could not re
cover. 75
69. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
70. 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
71. Barron's is a highly regarded publication in financial circles. The publica
tion of the article in Barron's was likely to be widely read and relied upon by both
brokerage houses and the investing public. Id. at 1345.
72. The financial organization of the plaintiff was stated to be as follows:
"Plaintiff Reliance Insurance Company ... is engaged in the property and casualty
insurance and life insurance businesses. Of the common stock of Insurance, 96.9% is
owned by Reliance Financial Services Corporation ... , the common stock of which
in tum is wholly owned by Reliance Group Incorporated ...." Id. at 1344.
73. Id. at 1345.
74. Id. at 1348. The court explained the basis of its holding as follows:
Filing a preliminary or red herring prospectus, a matter of public record, is
theoretically not an offer to sell securities, which can be made only when
the registration becomes final. But by doing so, an issuer thrusts itself into
the public eye, indicating by its action that it intends to have the registration
become complete and that the preliminary prospectus will mature into a fi
nal one, with resultant distribution of securities to the public.
Id. n.I.
75. The holding in Reliance vividly illustrates the difficult burden imposed
upon a plaintiff when the actual malice standard applies. The inequity of enlarging
the scope of such an onerous rule was one of the determinative factors in the Gertz
decision. To argue, as the Martin Marietta court does, that a plaintiff should be sub
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Although the court did not explicitly disagree with the reason
ing of Martin Marietta, it did note that courts have differed in
their analyses. 76 The Reliance court held: "[T]he standard for
determining whether or not a person or corporate entity is a public
figure is set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc .. ... "77 The court
concluded that the reasoning of Gertz should apply to corporations
as well as to natural persons. Implicit in this statement is a rejec
tion of the reasoning in Martin Marietta.
The approach taken by the Reliance and Trans World courts
regarding corporate plaintiffs in libel actions has much to commend
it. Focusing on the status of the plaintiff can spare a Mom and Pop
corporation the rigors of proving actual malice on the part of a li
bellant. At the same time, the status test of Gertz by no means lets
corporations off easily. Indeed, the plaintiffs in both Reliance and
Trans World had to prove actual malice and failed. The status
based test allows a court to consider the quality and quantity of
corporate activity. The issue-based test, on the other hand, re
stricts a court to evaluating the subject matter of the libelous state
ment.
Further support for applying the status-based test to all plain
tiffs, individual and corporate, can be found by examining the re
finements added to the test in recent years. The United States Su
preme Court has expressly recognized, in Time, Inc. v. Fire
stone,78 that a party can be classified as a public figure by having
placed itself in a legitimate public controversy.79 This avenue for
jected to the public or general interest standard with its concomitant greater likeli
hood of application of the actual malice rule, merely because the party happens to be
a corporation, is both unfair and illogical.
76. Id. at 1347. The judge cited only the Martin Marietta and Trans World
cases and briefly discussed those courts' holdings. He also stated, "It appeared pref
erable on this motion for summary judgment to follow Trans World Accounts, and
consider whether Insurance is a public figure in accordance with the terms set forth
in Gertz. See also, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, ...." Id. at 1347-48.
77. Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
78. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
79. 424 U.S. at 453. In contrast, the dissent reasoned:
Having thus rejected the appropriateness of judicial inquiry into 'the legiti
macy of interest in a particular event or subject,' Gertz obviously did not in
tend to sanction any such inquiry by its use of the term 'public contro
versy.' Yet that is precisely how I understood the Court's opinion to
interpret Gertz.
Id. at 488 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S.
at 78, 79). Justice Marshall's concern about the Court's seeming retreat to a
Rosenbloom type analysis has also been expressed by other commentators. See, e.g.,
McKenna, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: More Than A New Public Figure Standard?, 20
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 625 (1976); Comment, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: The Supreme Court's
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becoming a public figure acknowledges that the subject matter of
the libelous statement is gennane to the resolution of a libel action.
This refinement of the Gertz approach limits the impact of the
subject matter of the statement to the extent that the subject mat
ter affects the plaintiffs status. In Reliance, for example, the reso
lution of plaintiffs status as a public figure partially turned on the
fact that the libelous statement concerned a matter of legitimate
public concern, a stock offering. 80
Rosenbloom fails to adequately serve "the competing values at
stake" in a corporate libel action. Gertz properly recognizes those
values, namely the protection of the private reputation and free
dom of speech and press. 81 If, as Martin Marietta commands,
proof of actual malice is required of corporate plaintiffs solely be
cause matters of public or general interest are involved, the corpo
ration's fate may have been determined upon incorporation.
Countless small or obscure corporations invite little attention
and comment, just as few individuals seek notoriety. To the small
and relatively obscure corporation which often does not possess the
financial reserves to recover from the harm follOwing a libelous
publication, such libel may literally threaten its future existence.
Under the flexible status-based test outlined in Gertz, a deserving
corporation has a chance of vindicating its good name.
All corporations are not the same merely because they consti
tute the 'same basic type of legal entity. Since substantive differ
ences exist among corporations, similarity in treatment is not justi
fiable, at least in the libel context. The Martin Marietta court
ignored these substantive differences when it applied the public or
general interest standard. By its holding, the court grouped all cor
porate plaintiffs together and imposed the inflexible and unreasona
bly broad subject matter standard upon them. A far more equitable
result would have been obtained if the court had based its conclu
sion solely on the flexible rationale of Gertz, a standard which
forces courts to individualize rather than generalize.
Restrictive New Libel Ruling, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 435 (1976); Note, Time, Inc. v.
Firestone: Is Rosenbloom Really Dead?, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 216 (1976).
80. See Comment, In Search of the Corporate Private Figure: Defamation of
the Corporation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 339 (1977). This comment concludes that the
corporate plaintiff is subject to the same judicial result regardless of whether the
Gertz or the Rosenbloom test is used.
81. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. See also Comment, supra note
80, at 358-59. The author, however, concludes that the Gertz balance is "insuffi
ciently sensitive to first amendment considerations when applied to corporate plain
tiffs." Id. at 358.
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Corporations can be classified as public or private figures in
nearly the same manner as individuals are presently classified. The
Court in Gertz defined the group subject to public figure status as
"[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or
the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention,
are properly classed as public figures . . . ."82 It further divided
that category into two groups: public figures for all purposes and
public figures for limited circumstances. 83 This approach serves
corporate plaintiffs as well as natural persons by providing a
standard which judges can apply with a certain degree of consist
ency. There are admittedly some differences between corporations
and natural persons, the most significant being that a corporation is
purely a legal and intangible entity. It may be helpful, therefore,
to identify certain factors which a court could consider in applying
the public figure classification to corporations.
In certain instances, "the large corporation may merit classifi
cation as a 'public figure' simply on the basis of its impact on the
lives of its own employees. . . . "84 Moreover, such large corpora
tions have such a pervasive effect on most aspects of our lives that
they could be considered public figures under any circumstance. 85
Other factors which have been suggested to aid judges in their
determination whether a corporation is a public figure are annual
sales of the corporation, total assets held, nature of the business
the corporation is involved in, extent to which public exposure has
been sought or avoided, and pervasiveness of the corporation's in
fluence on sOciety.86 Also involved are the questions whether the
corporation is stock or nonstock and whether the stock is publicly
or privately held. The amount of public interest in the activities of
the corporation would also be relevant, but by no means should it
be the sole factor as commanded by Rosenbloom. The task of ap
plying the public figure standards of Gertz to corporations is not
beyond the capacity of judges or juries.
82. 418 U.S. at 342.
83. [d. at 343. See also note 35 supra.
84. Note, Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1496, 1507
(1969).
85. See generally Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 193 (1967)
(Warren, c.J., concurring ).
86. Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the
Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 990 (1975).
While recognizing that the question of corporate defamation and product dispar
agement may often involve similar and interrelated legal inquiries, due to the nature
of the court decision under analysis, the scope of this note is purposely limited to a
discussion of the field of corporate libel.
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Application of these criteria will result in many corporations
being classified as public figures. On the other hand, a significant
number of corporations, particularly smaller ones, would not qual
ify under any of these considerations. Absent a sound basis war
ranting classification as public figures, corporations should be al
lowed to protect their reputations free of the burdens mandated by
the actual malice standard.

John P. James

